Charles Darwin himself helped to start the debate on language change as a selection process. Here I examine two aspects of Darwin's contribution to this debate. Throughout I emphasize how much Darwin's own views differed from the views of present-day Darwinians. First, I consider the parallels Darwin identified between selection in language change and selection in species change. I argue that Darwin drew attention to these parallels mainly to undermine anti-evolutionist claims of high languages among races in a low state of civilization. Second, I consider the role Darwin attributed to selection in causing the biological changes that produced the power of articulate language in humans. I show that, in his argument on the evolution of the human vocal organs, Darwin combined sexual selection with what many Darwinians today regard as the opposite of selection, namely, the inheritance of acquired characters and habits ("Lamarckian inheritance").
Introduction
When linguists and others attempt to apply Darwinian theory to language, they do so looking over their shoulders.
1 It is well known that, in his two books on human evolution, The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex (1871) and The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872) , Charles Darwin himself addressed the two questions that continue to define the debate about language change as a selection process. One question is whether individual languages undergo something like selection as they evolve. The other is whether selection played a role in producing the power of articulate language in humans; and, if it did, whether selection was primarily responsible for the emergence of that power, or just one of several contributing causes.
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These questions are sometimes treated as independent of each other. Friedrich Max Müller, a contemporary of Darwin's, argued that selection shaped languages, but had not produced the power to speak them. Müller believed that he could accept selection as a linguistic fact while resisting it as a biological fact. Darwin tried to show otherwise. In the Descent, he listed a number of parallels between selection in language change and selection in species change. The list is famous. But Darwin's aim in drawing it up is quite forgotten. The aim was neither to throw light on language change for its own sake, nor to illustrate how widespread was the process of selection. Instead, Darwin used the evidence of selection change among languages to defend his evolutionary theory of human origins, and in particular his view that, if the theory was true, then primitive human races should speak evolutionarily lower languages than civilized races. I present the case for this reading of Darwin in the first part of this paper. In the second part, I turn to Darwin's selection argument on the origin of the power of articulate language -that is, the power to utter determinate vocal sounds serving, by convention, as signs for determinate ideas. It is rightly supposed that Darwin argued for sexual selection as a major cause of the changes that produced brains and vocal organs capable of supporting articulate language. In the details, however, Darwin's argument looks distinctly un-Darwinian, blending sexual selection with what many Darwinians today regard as the opposite of selection, namely, the inheritance of acquired characters and habits ("Lamarckian inheritance").
Selection in language change and species change
The list of language-species parallels appears in the first volume of the Descent, in the first of two chapters on "mental powers," in a section on "language." Most of the section is devoted to explaining how the power of articulate language, though unique, could have emerged as the result of natural causes operating among ape-like beings without that power. Close to the end of the section, and apparently à propos of nothing, Darwin announced that the "formation of different languages and of distinct species, and the proofs that both have been developed through a gradual process, are curiously the same" (Darwin, 1871 (Darwin, /1981 . The list of parallels followed. What were these curious similarities? Darwin pointed out, for example, that similar features among languages were sometimes due to derivation from a common ancestral language, much as similar features among species were sometimes due to derivation from a common ancestral species. Both languages and species, in short, showed homologies. They also showed analogies, as well as vestigial elements, and so on. Rounding out Darwin's list were parallels to do with selection. He wrote:
We see variability in every tongue, and new words are continually cropping up; but as there is a limit to the powers of the memory, single words, like whole languages, gradually become extinct. As Max Müller has well remarked: -'A struggle for life is constantly going on amongst the words and grammatical forms in each language. The better, the shorter, the easier forms are constantly gaining the upper hand, and they owe their success to their own inherent virtue.' To these more important causes of the survival of certain words, mere novelty may, I think, be added; for there is in the mind of man a strong love for slight changes in all things. The survival or preservation of certain favoured words in the struggle for existence is natural selection (Darwin, 1871 (Darwin, /1981 .
Darwin here preserved the words of Friedrich Max Müller, a German-born scholar of Sanskrit, based in Oxford. Müller was one of the most famous men of science in the last third of the nineteenth century. What Thomas Henry Huxley was to biology, and John Tyndall was to physics, Müller was to scientific philology: explainer-in-chief for the wider English-speaking public. Unlike Huxley and Tyndall, however, Müller was ferociously anti-Darwinian. In Müller's view, the roots of the Indo-European languages, uncovered through several generations of scrupulous philological research, showed that the power of articulate language could not have emerged gradually. For Müller, no selection process could have produced articulate humans out of inarticulate apish proto-humans. Müller did not back a selectional origins story. That said, he did think that a selection process of sorts had operated among the roots themselves, winnowing down an initially large set to the smaller number that in turn formed the basis of the major language groups. What, aside from opportunistic quoting from Müller, was Darwin up to here? Why this apparent digression on parallels between language change and species change? My own reading is quite different from that of Stephen Alter, whose Darwinism and the Linguistic Image (1999) deals at length with the parallels paragraph in the Descent. Alter argues that Darwin intended the parallels in part to drive a wedge between evolutionary speculation on human races and evolutionary speculation on human language (Alter, 1999, esp. pp. 104-105) . 4 It seems to me that the opposite is true. Indeed, Darwin signalled that he had race and language in his sights at the beginning of the very next paragraph. He wrote: "The perfectly regular and wonderfully complex construction of the languages of many barbarous nations has often been advanced as a proof, either of the divine origin of these languages, or of the high art and former civilisation of their founders" (Darwin, 1871 (Darwin, /1981 . In other words, there appeared to be linguistic evidence in conflict with Darwin's larger thesis in the first part of the Descent, that humans had emerged out of some more lowly species. Those skeptical about the up-from-below thesis had pointed out that there were peoples around the world -for instance, the Lapps and some native Americans -who lived under the most chaotic and primitive conditions, but spoke languages that were remarkably regular and complex. In the skeptics' opinion, it was hard to explain these mismatches between the state of civilization and the state of the language on an evolutionary view, but fairly easy to explain them on the Scriptural view that all peoples are more or less degraded or fallen descendants of a perfect primeval pair, Adam and Eve. 5 Darwin, like these skeptics, believed his theory predicted a world where people in an otherwise lowly state spoke correspondingly lowly languages. The problem posed by the skeptics was thus a serious one for Darwin, and he needed somehow to resolve this apparent conflict between his theory and the world it aimed to describe. What to do?
As the physicist and philosopher Pierre Duhem pointed out some decades later, and other students of the sciences have emphasized more recently, there are lots of moves a theorist can make to fix theoryworld mismatches. With respect to perfection, the following illustration will best shew how easily we may err: a Crinoid sometimes consists of no less than 150,000 pieces of shell, all arranged with perfect symmetry in radiating lines; but a naturalist does not consider an animal of this kind as more perfect than a bilateral one with comparatively few parts, and with none of these alike, excepting on the opposite sides of the body. He justly considers the differentiation and specialisation of organs as the test of perfection. So with languages, the most symmetrical and complex ought not to be ranked above irregular, abbreviated, and bastardised languages ... (Darwin, 1871 (Darwin, /1981 8
The point of the preceding parallels between language change and species change was to motivate just this switch to the more favorable, anomaly-dissolving scale of the naturalists. What the parallels showed, for Darwin at least, was that a large number of concepts used to understand species change applied equally well to language change. On the basis of that success, there was a prima facie case for supposing that the scale used to reckon species highness and lowness was the right scale to use in reckoning language highness and lowness. In sum, Darwin drew attention to parallels between language change and species change as part of a larger argument to show that, as his theory predicted (or so Darwin believed), lower human races spoke lower languages. This does not much sound like the Darwin that linguists and others honor today in their discussions of Darwinism and language. Did not Darwin famously admonish himself never to say "higher" or "lower"? His anti-slavery opinions, his solicitous attitude toward his Fuegian companions on the Beagle, and his backing of the theory of DARWIN ON LANGUAGE AND SELECTION 9 monogenesis (that all human races belong to one species) make it tempting to conclude that, on matters of race, Darwin was rather forward-thinking. But on race as on so much else, Darwin was of his age. Far from abstaining from talk of "higher" and "lower," he engaged in it constantly -and, in his view, coherently. A hierarchy among human races was something he felt he needed to explain, not explode.
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Let another remark of Darwin's, also on language, race, highness and lowness, underscore the point. The remark appears in his Expression book. Darwin claimed that chimpanzees and orangutans protruded their lips when feeling sulky. They pouted. He went on to argue that human children too pouted when sulky. The protrusion of the lips was, he wrote, more pronounced in savage than in civilized children -a difference that vindicated the evolutionary theory of expression, in Darwin's view, since savages were closer to the apes, and the expressive actions of savages were therefore expected to be more ape-like. "Nor is it an anomalous fact," wrote Darwin, "that the children of savages should exhibit a stronger tendency to protrude their lips, when sulky, than the children of civilized Europeans; for the essence of savagery seems to consist in the retention of a primordial condition, and this occasionally holds good even with bodily peculiarities" (Darwin, 1872 (Darwin, /1998 .
Selection and the origin of the power of articulate language
Darwinians today wince to find Darwin stating such opinions, now regarded as false and racist. Darwinian pride in the pioneer theorist of language and selection proves equally hard to sustain when it comes to the second language-selection question, about the role of selection in producing the power of articulate language in humans. Darwin argued that this power emerged gradually as ancestral proto-humans acquired both greater control over highly developed vocal organs and sufficiently high intelligence to use and understand articulate vocal sounds as signs for, say, this emotion, or that predator. Here I will concentrate on the vocal-organ side of the argument, though more or less analogous points could be made about the intelligence side. Darwin's main discussion of the evolution of the human vocal organs also occurs in the Descent, but in the second volume, on sexual selection (Darwin, 1871 (Darwin, /1981 . This discussion is further summarized, qualified and amplified in other writings, notably in the Expression (Darwin, 1872 (Darwin, /1998 . In outline, Darwin's argument is well known. During courtship, sweeter utterances proved more effective in wooing females, while harsher utterances proved more effective in frightening off male rivals. Males that vocalized more flamboyantly than other males thus competed more successfully for females. There was, in other words, sexual selection for vocal prowess. Generations of such selection eventually produced human vocal organs able to utter highly modulated, musical vocal sounds.
In support of this argument, Darwin adduced his usual wide range of facts. The use of vocal and other sounds was widespread among courting animals, notably birds. One species of ape, a gibbon, was reported to sing up and down a full octave when courting. Observing one of his own infants, Darwin noticed that the pitch of the sounds the boy uttered changed according to his emotional state. As Darwin later wrote, "I did not then see that this bears on the view which I have elsewhere maintained that before man used articulate language, he uttered notes in a true musical scale as does the anthropoid ape Hylobates" (Darwin, 1877 (Darwin, /1974 .
Especially revealing, in Darwin's view, was a connection existing in humans between depth of feeling and degree of vocal musicality.
10 According to Darwin, traffic along this connection went in both directions. A strong emotion summoned up vocal musicality, and vocal musicality summoned up strong emotions. When we speak under the influence of a strong emotion such as anger, the pitch of the voice rises and falls far more than when we speak calmly. Conversely, when we listen to a skillful orator and find ourselves responding emotionally, the rise and fall in pitch of the orator's voice is part of what stirs us. For Darwin, this two-way con-nection between strong emotions and the music of the voice made sense on the sexual-selectional theory of the origins of the human vocal organs. Generation after generation, ancestral males had used musical vocal utterances in courtship -the time when animals experienced the strongest possible emotions. As a result, vocal musicality and strong emotion came to be associated.
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Undoubtedly, this is a selection argument. There is variation in adaptation to local conditions. There is inheritance of variation. And there is greater reproductive success for those variants best adapted to local conditions. But what kind of selection argument is it, exactly? What, precisely, is being selected? The following passage from the Expression offers some clarification. Darwin wrote:
... there are no grounds, as far as I can discover, for believing that any muscle has been developed or even modified exclusively for the sake of expression. The vocal and other sound-producing organs, by which various expressive noises are produced, seem to form a partial exception; but I have elsewhere attempted to show that these organs were first developed for sexual purposes, in order that one sex might call or charm the other (Darwin, 1872 (Darwin, /1998 .
Note the distinction Darwin drew here between the later development of the vocal organs for expressive purposes, and the earlier development of those organs for sexual purposes. Let us take each side of the distinction between the expressive and the sexual in turn. In Darwin's view, it was one thing for males eventually to use their voices in order to communicate outward, to females, an inner state of the male mind: a feeling of sexual desire, a high opinion of the looks of a potential mate, and so on. That, in Darwin's terms, was vocalizing for expressive purposes; and that came later, after articulate language had come into being. Before articulate language, there was something non-expressive, that is, something sexual.
What we expect from a sexual selection argument on vocal prowess, I take it, is the view that certain males just chanced to be born with a disposition to sing sweetly when wooing and harshly when fending off rivals. Such an argument falls well within the tradition of sexual selection theorizing, not least Darwin's own.
12 But Darwin presents rather a different argument. According to Darwin, certain males discovered that when, during courtship, they produced more musical utterances than did competing suitors, their sexual desire was more regularly gratified. Thanks to such regular gratification, musical vocal utterances in these males became habitual; these males got into the habit of singing during courtship. Again, in Darwin's view, nothing in the males' heads was being expressed. Rather, something in their heads came to be associated with a certain action; and as these habitually musical males sang their way to reproductive glory, they exercised the muscles of their vocal organs, with these organs in turn improving as musical instruments.
So, in Darwin's scenario, certain males acquired a new habit (singing under conditions of courtship) and a new or at least modified character (vocal organs better for singing). And when these musical males in turn had male offspring, the newly acquired habits and characters were passed on to the offspring. This inheritance of an adaptive, acquired habit and an adaptive, acquired character constitutes the "Lamarckian" element in Darwin's argument (after the French naturalist Jean-Baptiste de Lamarck).
Needless to say, the inheritance of acquired characters and habits is no longer part of mainstream biological belief. In much of the present discussion about language and selection, when the phrase "Lamarkian inheritance" and its associates occur, they are used, as Darwin himself might have put it, in a large and metaphorical sense.
13 Lamarckian terminology helps those who debate language and selection now to underscore a fundamental difference between change in biological systems and change in cultural systems, along the following lines. The adaptive rewards we humans reap when we exercise our bodies cannot be passed on to our offspring. No matter how much effort we expend in improving our bodies in our own lifetimes, our children are born better adapted or worse adapted as a matter of chance. Biologically, the improvements of one gen-eration cannot be preserved and built upon in the next. Culturally, however, the situation is much happier. Human children can learn from their parents' experience. Through education, the cultural attainments (including linguistic) of the previous generation form the baseline for the next generation. With something like this contrast in mind, "Darwinian inheritance" or "Mendelian inheritance" in biology is thus contrasted with "Lamarckian inheritance" in culture.
14 Here I am recalling a moment in the history of biology when belief in the inheritance of acquired characters and habits was widespread and largely unchallenged. Like Lamarck, Darwin believed that, under certain circumstances, individuals who actively improved their bodies passed those improvements on to offspring. In its biology, a human child was thus the beneficiary of its parents' experience. Nor did Darwin regard the inheritance of acquired characters and habits as a brute fact, incapable of further explanation. Darwin's theory of pangenesis, published in 1868 but formulated as long before as 1841, was intended in part to explain how changes in parents' bodies could be impressed upon the organic material from which their offspring formed. 15 For Darwin, what was literally inherited in the case of language were tiny gemmules that caused the male offspring of the most musical males to develop elaborate vocal organs as well as brains organized to support singing under conditions of courtship.
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These offspring were beneficiaries of Lamarckian inheritance not in their cultures but in their biologies. So, when we consider Darwin's argument on sexual selection and the human vocal organs, we are dealing with literal Lamarckism. What we are not dealing with is straightforward Lamarckism, since, in Darwin's view, male offspring benefited from their fathers' efforts so far as, like their fathers, the offspring had advantages in the struggle for mates, and outcompeted other males of their generation in virtue of these advantages.
Why did Darwin offer such an elaborate, hybrid argument? Why this admixture of sexual selection and the inheritance of acquired characters and habits? To the present-day Darwinian, such blending appears to betray a failure of nerve on Darwin's part. But that diagnosis is anachronistic. We need to ask whether, from Darwin's point of view, there were good reasons not to let selection do all the explanatory work on its own. A further passage from the Expression points in the right direction.
In the book's concluding chapter, Darwin wrote: "Some expressive movements may have arisen spontaneously, in association with certain states of the mind ... and afterwards been inherited. But I know of no evidence rendering this view probable" (Darwin, 1872 (Darwin, /1998 ). Darwin here rejected as improbable that, say, a male found himself regularly singing when feeling sexual desire, not because singing had brought regular gratification of that desire in the past, but because his brain had spontaneously changed in a way that made him sing whenever he felt sexual desire. In Darwin's view, the evidence needed to upgrade that possible scenario into a probable one was lacking. Now let us compare the argument that Darwin rejected here -that the brains of certain adult males chanced to reorganize, thereafter causing them to behave adaptively under the influence of certain emotions -with the selection argument that modern readers of Darwin expect to find in his writings but do not -that certain males chanced to be born with brains causing those males to sing sweetly when wooing and harshly when fending off rivals. For Darwin, while it was certainly possible that spontaneous changes in adult male brains had created dispositions to act in complicated but advantageous ways when male minds were in certain states, the evidence did not warrant upgrading that possibility to a probability. Bearing in mind the low evidential status Darwin thus accorded to the possibility of spontaneous but advantageous changes in the brains of adult males, it may be that, in Darwin's view, the missing selection argument too would have suffered from poor empirical credentials, for roughly similar reasons. It is a short step from rejecting, for lack of evidence, the chance formation in an adult brain of a disposition to act in a complicated but advantageous way when under the influence of a certain emotion, to rejecting the chance formation of the same in the brain of a developing fetus. And once one has rejected the latter possibility, one has effectively rejected selection, acting on inborn chance variation, as an explanation of first choice.
The point is that, from Darwin's perspective on expression, spontaneous-change scenarios were much less attractive on evidential grounds than inherited-habit scenarios. As he explained, he had insufficient observational evidence that brains changed spontaneously yet advantageously. By contrast, he had abundant observational evidence (as do we) that people and animals formed advantageous habits. Moreover, there was no principled reason to suppose at the time (unlike now) that habits and their effects were incapable of being inherited. On the contrary, there seemed to be persuasive evidence that they were heritable. Looked at from Darwin's perspective, then, it may have been far more desirable to build an explanation of expressive behavior out of habit formation than out of spontaneous anatomical changes, and so out of Lamarckian inheritance rather than selection on inborn chance variation.
Could this interpretation possibly be right? Could evidential scruples have led Darwin to favor a blend of Lamarckian inheritance and sexual selection over straightforward selection? Again, it has become conventional to view Darwin's Lamarckism as weakening his selection theories, not strengthening them. 17 To be sure, taken on its own, the slender passage quoted above, about the improbability of spontaneous brain changes causing expressive behavior, cannot support a wholesale inversion of this view. Rather, the passage needs to be seen in light of Darwin's long devotion to having independent evidence for the causes invoked in his theories. To a remarkable degree, Darwin had reflected throughout his career on the nature of empirical warrant. As a disciple of the geologist Charles Lyell and the astronomer John Herschel, Darwin had sought to produce theories that conformed to the vera causa ideal of scientific method. In Darwin's view, the causes that together produced natural selection -variation, inheritance and the struggle for existence -were all "true causes," that is, causes evidenced independently of the facts they were held to explain.
18 So Darwin was sounding an old and dear theme when he wrote, in the Expression, about what the evidence warranted in connection with spontaneous but advantageous brain changes, and what it did not warrant. In brief, Darwin's reluctance to appeal solely to selection in his theorizing about the emergence of the human vocal organs might well have been a consequence of the same commitment to empiricallysecure theorizing that led him to formulate his theory of natural selection in the first place.
Conclusion
When we bring into focus Darwin's own arguments on language change as a selection process, the distance between Darwin and those who take a Darwinian stance nowadays is striking. Those who claim now that the elements of language undergo selection aim to provide a deeper understanding of why languages change as they do. When they consider how selection might have produced the biological substrate of language, they appeal to a theory in which heritable chance variation is all. Darwin himself had other ends and other means. He argued that languages undergo selection in order to combat creationist queries about high languages among otherwise lowly races. His argument on the emergence of the power of articulate language meshed sexual selection with what now seems the opposite of selection, namely, the inheritance of acquired characters and habits.
The recovery of Darwin's own views on language change as a selection process creates one new historical puzzle and helps solve an old one. The new puzzle is how Darwinian theory came to predict two quite opposite sets of facts about race and language. Darwin took for granted that, if humans descended from ape-like beings, then humans living in more primitive societies ought to speak correspondingly primitive languages. Such was a prediction of the theory, in Darwin's day. Now the theory predicts no such thing. Whence this change? Here I can do no more than sketch the answer. The central events occurred during the heyday of saltationism in evolutionary theorizing, around the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. The prime mover was the German-born American anthropologist Franz Boas. In opposition to the Darwinian race-rankers of the nineteenth century, Boas and his students held that evolution had created all people as biological equals, with differences between them arising through the medium of culture. In the Boasian view, languages with simple grammars or few abstract words did not reflect a lack of mental capacity on the part of the speakers of those languages. Rather, claims about the highness and lowness of different languages reflected the racial prejudice of those making the claims.
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The old puzzle concerns Darwin's longest work on language, in the broadest sense: his Expression book. For Darwinians today, it is a deeply frustrating book, wildly and even bizarrely un-Darwinian. 20 In other areas of his theorizing, after all, Darwin took for granted that certain features of organisms were adaptations, and then set about explaining how natural selection could have produced those features. When it came to expression, however, Darwin often denied there were adaptations to explain. In his view, many expressive actions did not arise for the sake of expression, through the action of natural selection. Rather, they arose as simple habits, formed under now vanished circumstances and uselessly passed on thereafter. The puzzle is why Darwin so vigorously abstained from bringing the usual Darwinian explanatory apparatus to bear on expression. 21 My suggestion is that, in attempting to understand the un-Darwinian character of Darwin's expression theorizing generally, we adopt the perspective developed here in the analysis of Darwin's argument on the emergence of the musical vocal organs. As we have seen, in this particular instance, Darwin's limiting himself to verae causae, the "true causes," might well have prompted him to prefer a blend of Lamarckian inheritance and sexual selection to straightforward selection. 22 We can generalize from this conclusion as follows. At the time, it was a common observation that habits formed easily and died hard, so that actions of no use came to accompany certain states of mind. It was also accepted as a common observation that acquired habits and characters could be inherited. But it was not at all a common observation that changes in brains occurred spontaneously and in such a way that useful actions and states of mind were thereafter linked.
Suppose that something like these reflections on expression and empirical warrant prompted Darwin to theorize as he did in the Expression. I have already mentioned one irony: that the methodological ideal that led Darwin to selection in the first place also led him to neglect selection when theorizing about expression. Let me conclude with a second irony: that, from the point of view of the Darwinian present, it was Darwin's allegiance to admitting only true causes into his theories that led him, when it came to expression, to admit false ones. Tied to a methodological ideal that kept his theorizing close to the observed world, Darwin found that selection could get no explanatory purchase on the phenomena of expression. It was not because Darwin failed to respect the evidence that he explained expression as he did. It was, if anything, because he respected the evidence too much. On Boas' impact more generally, see Darnell (1998) . 20 On the un-Darwinian character of the arguments in the Expression, see Fridlund (1992) . 21 For supplementary explanations to the one presented here, see Burkhardt (1985, p. 360) , Montgomery (1985, p. 47) and Fridlund (1992, p. 117) . 22 It has been little noted that the Expression, like the Origin, reflects Darwin's allegiance to the vera causa ideal in argumentative structure and strategy. The initial chapters of the Expression set out to establish, via evidence little connected with expression, the existence of the causal principles used later in the book to explain the phenomena of expression. On the vera causa ideal and the structure and strategy of the Origin, see Hodge 1977 . On the intellectual and cultural contexts of Darwin's vera causa reasoning generally, see, respectively, Hull (2003) and Radick (2003) .
23 I do not mean to suggest that the vera causa ideal lent itself inflexibly and straightforwardly to a single interpretation. Even in Darwin's case, there seem to have been many routes to accommodation. To take an extreme but apposite example: in the same year (1872) that Darwin published the Expression, he published the sixth and final edition of the Origin, and thus simultaneously argued that the inheritance of acquired characters and habits trumped natural selection in explaining certain instinctual actions (Expression), and that just the opposite was true -"I believe that the effects of habit are in many cases of subordinate importance to the effects of the natural selection of what may be called spontaneous variations of instincts; -that is of variations produced by the same unknown causes which produce slight deviations of bodily structure" (Origin). See Peckham (1959, p. 382, 28:f ) .
